In this paper we show, using two samples of Latin American MFIs (41 MFIs from 2005-2014 and 102 MFIs from 2010-2014) that there is no relation between the percentage of female borrowers in an MFI portfolio and MFI economic outcomes. We verified the return on equity for companies focused on women tend to be smaller. Whilst the cost per borrower is smaller, this is not related to the loan portfolio size. When focusing on the portfolio-at-risk and gender the relation is not found when using a dynamic panel to account for serial autocorrelation, not accepting the hypothesis that women repay better than men. Thus, this paper suggests that MFIs lend more towards women for reasons that are beyond just "economical", such as empowering women and help poor people, otherwise unable to access credit lines, get loans.
Introduction
In the last decades microfinance has been achieving increasing prominence in policy-making for the poor. Muhammad Yunus, microfinance pioneer, founded the Grameen Bank in 1976. He received the Nobel Peace Prize thirty years later due to the social impact of his initiative, which focuses in borrowing to women. Among him, many companies -and empirical evidence -emphasize the role of women in achieving the desired financial and social outcome. However, there is not much agreement on how the percentage of females in the microfinance institutions (henceforth MFIs) portfolio should affect its economical outcome.
We show, using two samples of Latin American MFIs (41 MFIs from 2005-2014 and 102 MFIs from 2010-2014) that, although there is an association between a higher percentage of females borrowers and a lower portfolio at risk, when using a dynamic panel in order to control serial autocorrelation there is no effect between the gender of the portfolio and the portfolio at risk. We also present this evidence through a logistic regression and a two-staged least squares.
Thus, this paper suggests that MFIs in Latin America lend more towards women for reasons that are beyond just "economical". These other goals may be empowering women and providing access to credit to those that cannot get it through the established financial market as, in developing countries, a large neglected part of this market is comprised of women.
These social outcomes are not tested in this paper, but are not negligible when studying the microfinance phenomena. Nevertheless, in financial terms, we dismiss the economical hypotheses regarding women being more important to banks than men.
The paper is structured as follows: section two is a brief literature review. This literature review is mainly focused on both on correlational finance articles and in experimental field data. Section three presents the econometric methods used and the results achieved.
We conclude at section four with some practical issues related to women and microfinance.
2 Literature Review
MFI and women
In a overview of MFIs, Hulme and Mosley (1996) had shown they tend to have a high percentage of females in their loan portfolio. The many reasons for this are classified, discussed and summarized in this section. Three explanations considered are the economical -that can be segmented between in the ones based in gender differences in financial decision making and in the contextual economic reasons -and non-economical reasons.
It is argued that MFIs may tend to lend more toward women because they may be better customers (Abdullah and Quayes, 2016; Hermes et al., 2011) , being this a financialdecision making reason. Support for the "economic view" can be drawn by the fact that women may be more susceptible to peer pressure in microfinance (Goetz and Gupta, 1996; Rahman, 2001) , and that women tend to be closer to home and not to travel, what can increase the monitoring power of MFIs (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2004; Goetz and Gupta, 1996) . Another argument could be made that women cannot access traditional finance and credit lines due to lack of credit history and collateral, and thus they have a greater need to repay the loans in order to access future credit lines (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2004) .
Nevertheless, Armendáriz and Morduch (2004) noted that the Bank Rakayat in Indonesia had an almost-perfect repayment score without any specific target towards women.
Also it could be that banks that have better strategies to overcome the "collateral problem" are also the ones that lend more to women, due to "non-economic reasons". If women are as good customers as men, then another explanation are non-economical (or ethical) reasons.
MFIs may view women as more "unfavored", and thus they lend to women in order to empower them (Hunt and Kasynathan, 2001; Mayoux, 2002; Weber and Ahmad, 2014) .
Thus, an utility-maximizing MFI may lend to women in order to maximize its "economic" returns if women are better clients. Even if they are indeed better clients, an utility-maximizing MFI may lend to women for reasons other than just "economical" if their utility function encompasses "non-economical terms" such as maximizing outreach and maximizing the improvement in their clients lives. However, if there is no economical causal benefit for lending to women, a preference in this lending behavior of the firm can only be explained by these "non-economical" reasons. However, how can we deriver better causal assessments (and not just mere associations) between the percentage of women in a portfolio and the financial outcomes of an MFI? We discuss that in the next subsection.
Causality assessments
It is important to find causal mechanisms that explain how microfinance may affect the real world. In many studies the treatment and control group are seldom the same in terms observables variables such as loan amount, landholding and in unobservable characteristics like investment opportunities and intrinsic risk. These issues raise questions about the exogeneity of the treatment and claims of causality. Thus, for non-randomized studies the researcher must use the "statistical toolbox" in order to reduce the effect of possible alternative explanations.
Randomized Control Trials (RCTs) are considered one of the best solutions to deal with the lack of exogeneity in microfinance research Karlan et al. (2009) . In a big review, Banerjee et al. (2015b) evaluated six RCTs published in American Economic Journal:
Applied Economics, establishing RCTs as the golden standard of causality assessments in microfinance reserach.
In this research line, economic reasons have been explored by several authors in different cultures. As an example, in a Philippines study Ashraf et al. (2006) have shown that women with a lower discount rate for future relative to current trade-offs are usually more probable to commit to deposit money without the possibility of withdrawing before an accorded time.
Nevertheless, RCTs are not perfect. The researcher may gamble on luck by including several dependent variables, or increasing the sample size after doing preliminary estimations. The p-values are reliable in a single estimation: when a researcher starts using several dependent variables the likelihood of finding a false positive increases sharply. Thus, to claim causality, the researcher not only must focus his or her attention on design, but also on the statistical methods and assumptions behind the estimated models.
In addition, RCTs are not always a possible solution. Many times the research question that a paper wants to answer is related to a variable that cannot be manipulated.
Thus, other statistical methods can be use to reduce endogeneity, such as fixed-effects panel data (Abdullah and Quayes, 2016; Khandker, 2005) , hierarchical models (Leite et al., 2016) or dynamic panels (Khandker and Samad, 2014) .
That is the case in our paper. We cannot randomly assign different percentages of female borrowers for different firms. Therefore, in this paper we use secondary data with several different statistical techniques -panel logit, dynamic panel and an instrumental variable approach in a two-stage least squares -in order to assess if there is any economic reasoning behind microfinance for women. Whilst not completely causal, the usage of these methods together may suggest a very robust correlation. 
Empirical Results

Sample and variables
Logistic model
We first assess if there is any relation between the economic indicators of MFI performance and the composition of its portfolio of clients, namely the percentage of female borrowers (PFB). To test this relation we tested if the economics indicators of an year t could predict the PFB of that MFI in the same year t.
We created the variable f em i,t , which is a dummy, to equal 1 if P F B i,t > 41 i=1 P F Bt 41 . Thus the dummy f em i,t equals 1 if the MFI i had a PFB greater than the mean for that year t. After the creation of this variable we estimates the following logistic panel model:
In the above mentioned model X i,t is the vector of main variables in this study (gross loan portfolio, profit margin, yield on gross loan portfolio, portfolio at risk, operational self-sufficiency cost per borrower and return on equity), θ i is the MFI fixed effects and τ i,t is the crisis fixed effects. In the model the Λ denotes the logistic CDF (Λ(X i,t β) = r 1−r with r = e X i,t β ). Table 1 shows the results for the estimations. In order to solve these problems we use two different methods. The first one is the estimation of a dynamic panel using first-differences as instruments in a generalized method of moments (developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) ), applying the routine developed by Roodman (2009) . The equation below describes the model used:
Thus, the portfolio at risk on year t is explained by its lag P @R i,t−1 and the first differences in the other variables as instruments (X i,t − X i,t−1 ). Thus, this method eliminate the necessity of fixed effects, since all time-invariant effects are eliminated through the first-differences. Nevertheless, this model assumes that there are not overidentification in the instruments and that, after controlling for the dynamic effects, there is no significant autocorrelation.
We also performed an instrumental variable analyses. First we created a weakly exogenous dummy variable f em i,t , as described bellow (based on the results presented at section 3.2):
Then we used f em i,t in the following regression: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Other variables (X i,t ) are omitted.
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As the first case this method assumes no overidentification. In addition it also assumes weak exogeneity, and we test both assumptions. Table 2 shows the results from all estimations.
First, there is no significant evidence of first and second other autocorrelation and overidentification restrictions on the dynamic panel model. Additionally there is no significant evidence of endogeneity (thus our instrument is weakly exogenous) and overidentification restrictionson the 2sls model. The results show no evidence that a higher female portfolio composition leads to lower portfolio at risk.
2010-2014 sample
In this section we apply the dynamic panel model depicted at the previous section 3.3.1 in a balanced sample that include only the years between 2010 and 2014. As a result that increases the number of MFIs in our sample: from 41 (12 countries) to 102 (15 countries)
in the post-crisis scenario.
In addition, we compare our results to a "naïve" estimation described bellow:
In the above model η i,t are year fixed effects, since our sample only includes postcrisis observations. This estimation is "naïve" in the sense that it does not account for autocorrelation, which is strong even in this smaller time frame (P@R(90days): F (1, 101) = 32.19, p < .001; P@R(30days): F (1, 101) = 47.18, p < .001). The results from both models are depicted at Table 3 .
The results from the dynamic panel from a larger sample in the 2010-2014 time period replicated the ones from the previous section 3.3.1: there is no significant relationship between PFB and P@R. Nevertheless, using the specification that is similar to the used by Abdullah and Quayes (2016) and D'espallier et al. (2011) , the result is that there is a significant negative relationship, so that the greater the female share in the MFI portfolio, the smaller the portfolio at risk.
Nevertheless, since there is serial autocorrelation, this result is biased. By using the lag of the P@R as a control and using P F B i,t −P F B i,t−1 as an instrument we can reduce this bias and make claims of causality stronger, since the P@R is explained by the increase or decrease of PFB, eliminating thus a possible spurious interpretation (it is not that MFIs that lend more to women experience higher repayments rates, but MFIs with high repayment rates are the ones that lend more to women). Thus, we show that, although a panel model suggests there is a relationship between PFB and P@R, when using the lag of P@R as a control and first-differences as instruments for the independent variables, this relationship disappears.
Conclusion
We found that an MFI lending to women is associated with a smaller cost per borrower, but smaller returns on equity and no difference on gross loan portfolio, which may suggest it is a more diluted base of clients. This is not consistent with "economical" motives.
Rather, this may suggest that there may be "non-economical" motives behind the decision of increasing the participation of women in an MFI's portfolio.
Indeed, we found no evidence that a higher percentage of female borrowers in an MFI portfolio is related to a smaller portfolio at risk, what strengths the claim that, at least in Latin America, the reasons for an MFI to lend money to women are beyond just "economical". Those reasons could be empowering women, or increasing social welfare (Banerjee et al., 2015a) .
In addition we also compared the estimations between a conventional panel (with MFI and year fixed effects) and a dynamic panel, which uses the lag of the dependent variable as a control and first-differences of the independent variables as instruments. This approach enhances the claim of causality, since it accounts for autocorrelation and uses instruments instead of the variables.
While the conventional panel showed a significant negative relationship between the percentage of females in the MFI portfolio and the portfolio at risk (both 30 and 90 days), when accounting for correlation and using instrumental variables (first-differences), this relationship disappeared. Therefore, we claim that there is no causal evidence which shows that females are inherent better clients than males, at least in Latin America.
Possible implications of these results are important for the decision-making process of MFIs. Although the literature focused on why it could be economically beneficial for MFIs to lend for women (Abdullah and Quayes, 2016; D'espallier et al., 2011) , we show that this economical difference may not be such a significant difference after all. Thus, when an MFI is deciding whether or not to increase the percentage of female borrowers in its portfolio, "non-economical" factors should also be considered.
For future research, other research questions such as how is the decision-making weight of "non-economical" (or ethical) factors could be explored, since in this paper we show evidence that these factors could be as (or even more) important in the MFI decision-making than just "economical" ones.
